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We are gratified that our article (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013) has elicited such interest, and 
we are happy to reply briefly to each of the five comments. 
Nickerson (this issue) concurs with our conclusion (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, this 
issue) that there is no empirical evidence for any critical positivity ratio. She also makes an 
important contribution to this discussion by stressing the distinction between within-person 
across-time theories and within-time across-persons theories.  Both types of theories are valuable 
in psychology, but they are conceptually distinct and by no means equivalent.  We feel that this 
distinction deserves to be more widely discussed in the literature on research methods. 
Guastello (this issue) argues that nonlinear-dynamics models in psychology can be tested 
empirically using time-series data.  We concur, but we take no position on the specific tests that 
he advocates or on the nonlinear-dynamics models in psychology that he asserts are “supported 
by real data.” 
Musau (this issue) contends that we went “too far” in describing Fredrickson and 
Losada’s (2005) article as “based on a series of erroneous and, for the most part, completely 
illusory `applications' of mathematics” (Brown et al., 2013, p. 812).  But he does not present any 
evidence that this characterization of Fredrickson and Losada (2005) is anything other than 
literally accurate; indeed, he explicitly declines to “venture into the validity of Brown et al.’s 
assertions,” despite having impugned the accuracy of those assertions in his immediately 
preceding sentence!  Instead, Musau merely uses a hypothetical example to argue that 
mathematical modeling can, under appropriate circumstances, be valid and useful in 
psychology—which is something we never disputed. 
Along similar lines, Hämäläinen, Luoma, and Saarinen (this issue) chide us for saying 
that Fredrickson and Losada (2005) “contains numerous fundamental conceptual and 
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mathematical errors” (Brown et al., 2013, p. 801).  They concede our main point, namely the 
complete lack of justification for the use of the Lorenz equations in modeling the time evolution 
of human emotions; but they also assert, incorrectly, that Fredrickson and Losada’s article 
contains “no clear mathematical errors.”  Among the purely mathematical errors clearly noted in 
our article are Fredrickson and Losada's assertion that the r = 22 data (alleged to be characteristic 
of “medium-performance teams”) end up in a limit cycle (Brown et al., 2013, p. 808), and their 
implicit claims concerning the absence of chaotic attraction at large values of r (Brown et al., 
2013, p. 812).  But we are happy to agree with Hämäläinen et al. that the central flaws in 
Fredrickson and Losada (2005) and its predecessor articles are logical and conceptual, not 
narrowly mathematical.  And they are, as we have demonstrated, overwhelming. 
Where we unequivocally take issue with Hämäläinen et al. (this issue) is with their 
assertion that physicists derive their models “by fitting equations to empirical data.”  In fact, the 
vast majority of models in contemporary physics, including virtually all those in which the 
mechanical functioning of a system is described by differential equations, are derivable from first 
principles by applying well-verified theories to a specific problem and then making plausible 
simplifications or approximations.  Indeed, Lorenz's (1963) article—from which Fredrickson and 
Losada (2005) purported to take their inspiration—is an excellent example of this process: 
Lorenz started from the standard equations of fluid dynamics for convective motion, and then 
truncated those equations by retaining only three Fourier modes (the ones that were most 
important to the solutions under study).  Empirical observations may serve to validate a 
theoretical model, and discrepancies between predicted and observed results can lead to the 
modification of theories or the generation of entirely new ones, but it is misguided to think that 
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contemporary physicists' models are derived solely, or even principally, “by fitting equations to 
empirical data.” 
In the remainder of their comment, Hämäläinen et al. (this issue) venture into even more 
hazardous epistemological territory.  They acknowledge that “in the behavioral sciences ... very 
few problems can be described by differential equations so that these would be fitted to empirical 
data successfully,” but they then draw the odd conclusion that this lack of empirical confirmation 
is “a rationale to embrace mathematical modeling, not to discard it.”  One is left wondering 
under what set of circumstances these authors would see a rationale not to “embrace 
mathematical modeling.”  Finally, their statement that “When models are used to facilitate 
scientific reasoning, the most important issue is not the adequacy of fit with empirical data, but 
whether the model fits the purpose of the model at hand” leaves us, frankly, astonished.  The link 
between theory and empirical test in science is often a subtle one, but the absolute need for such 
a link cannot simply be dismissed by vague claims about whether a model fits its own purpose. 
Lefebvre and Schwartz (this issue) start from the empirical claim that “for flourishing 
subjects the ratio of positive to negative emotion is greater than 3, and for languishing subjects 
this ratio is less than 3.”  The trouble is that this assertion is entirely incorrect.  Since the 
empirical evidence concerning the alleged critical positivity ratio of 3 is examined at length in 
our latest article (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, this issue) and also briefly in Nickerson's comment 
(this issue), we need not repeat the details here. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence 
whatsoever for the existence of any critical positivity ratio (whether 3 or anything else); indeed, 
there is significant evidence against.  So, far from this being “a verified empirical ratio in search 
of a theory,” what Lefebvre and Schwartz present in the remainder of their comment is, rather, a 
theory aimed at explaining a nonexistent phenomenon.  Moreover, their theory fails even at this 
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latter task, because it does not predict any discontinuous phase transition: rather, under the 
(arbitrary) assumption that Pb = 1/2, the ratio P/(1−P) passes smoothly through 3 as Pa passes 
through the (arbitrary) dividing line 1/2. 
So what are the implications for psychology of the demise of the critical positivity ratio? 
Almost 50 years have passed since the appearance of Meehl’s (1967) classic article 
contrasting the methods of physics and psychology.  One of the issues raised by Meehl is that 
“there exists among psychologists ... a fairly widespread tendency to report experimental 
findings with a liberal use of ad hoc explanations for those that didn’t ‘pan out’” (p. 114); we are 
not convinced that this tendency is any less widespread today.  Of course, psychologists can, 
with considerable justification, retort that theirs is the most difficult science of all, with a subject 
matter vastly more complex than that of any other field; and this complexity accounts, in an 
entirely honorable way, for the almost complete lack of what would in other sciences be 
recognized as theory— namely, that which “allows you [to] infer what would happen to things in 
certain situations without creating the situations” (Borsboom, 2013, para. 4).  However, 
psychologists need to accept that they cannot have their “hard science” cake and eat it too.  The 
mathematical models used in the physical sciences, many of which are based on differential 
equations, require extensive replication and confirmation—often to extremely high precision—
before they are accepted; and they are put to a severe test every time any of us turns on a 
computer or boards an airplane. 
It is, of course, possible that psychologists might one day develop quantitative models of 
some aspects of human behavior with sufficiently high predictive value that one could make 
decisions in therapeutic, public-policy, or other applied contexts with almost complete 
confidence in their outcomes.  However, given the present limitations of our ability to predict 
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how people are likely to behave in the next second—let alone the next hour, week, or year—it 
seems to us that, for the foreseeable future, any claims to have identified such a quantitative 
model of the psychology of the individual will merely turn out to be further examples of what 
could be termed “romantic scientism”: namely, unfulfillable dreams for a simple “scientific” 
explanation of complex phenomena, combined with an inadequate appreciation of the degree of 
empirical confirmation that is a requisite of genuine science.  The saga of the critical positivity 
ratio—and its largely uncritical acceptance within the positive psychology community—
exemplifies both aspects.  The fact that the three-dimensional plot of the Lorenz attractor bears a 
certain degree of visual resemblance to a butterfly when inspected from particular angles is 
without doubt aesthetically pleasing, but this observation does not somehow romantically imbue 
the series of equations that generate the attractor with the power to predict human emotions. 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000), in their founding manifesto of positive 
psychology, criticized its precursor, humanistic psychology, for its lack of scientific rigor and 
corresponding unbridled romanticism, and promised a more scientifically responsible approach.  
They stated: 
Unfortunately, humanistic psychology did not attract much of a cumulative empirical 
base, and it spawned myriad therapeutic self–help movements. … However, one legacy 
of the humanism of the 1960s is prominently displayed in any large bookstore: The 
“psychology” section contains at least 10 shelves on crystal healing, aromatherapy, and 
reaching the inner child for every shelf of books that tries to uphold some scholarly 
standard. (p. 7) 
Yet Fredrickson and Losada’s (2005) article, which has become one of the pillars of positive 
psychology and has both been widely cited in the scientific literature and influential in many 
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applied realms, has betrayed that promise by replicating—albeit in a different style—many of the 
same problems that were criticized by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi.  Even the bookstores are 
replete with literally dozens of popular treatments of positive psychology that present the critical 
positivity ratio of 2.9013 (or 2.9, or 3) as a major scientific finding, when it is nothing of the sort.  
That the sin is now romantic scientism rather than pure romanticism is not, in our view, a great 
advance. 
Fredrickson and Losada’s (2005) article was the subject of over 350 scholarly citations 
before our critique (Brown et al., 2013) appeared, and its principal “conclusions” have been 
featured in many lectures and public presentations by senior members of the positive psychology 
research community, although its deficiencies ought to have been visible to anyone with a 
modest grasp of mathematics and a little curiosity.  Unfortunately—because human behavior is, 
after all, complex and difficult to understand—we have no way of knowing whether the fact that 
it took so long for these deficiencies to be recognized was due to an unwarranted degree of 
optimism about the reliability of the peer-review process, a reluctance to make waves in the face 
of powerful interests, a general lack of critical thinking within positive psychology, or some 
other factor.  We hope that our revelation of the problems with the critical positivity ratio 
ultimately demonstrates the success of science as a self-correcting endeavor; however, we would 
have greatly preferred it if our work had not been necessary in the first place. 
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